van egy érzésem, hogy figyelemre méltónak, érdekesnek találnád. bernardo a determinizmus--szabad akarat hamis dilemma nélkül is arra a következtetésre jut, hogy nincs semmi 'szabad akarat'. akarat esetleg lehet, sőt. de semmi rejtélyes 'szabad' szál nem alkotja.
"We have free will, both individual and collective, and our decisions shape how the world unfolds."
i am not quite sure how you're using 'free-will' here, but decisions don't automatically imply any concept of 'free-will'. decisiding, deliberating, reflecting, choosing among options... don't require any conception of 'free-will'. we can do all these perfectly determined, and determinism doesn't entail predeterminism.
also, if there is determinism, or determinism+indeterminism (which is again an idea that the relevant experts don't at all agree on whether it's intelligible at all!), change and all our experiences are still perfectly real, just not necessarily have properties or 'natures' that we may pre-theoretically, maybe even implicitly, and rather tacitly assign to our experiences.
we choose, we reflect... just not magically, mysteriously, but deterministically, ie. explainably, intelligibly, in all-encompassing relational interdependence.
and again, it seems clear that reality is always exactly as it is, and it's not pre-designed by us; we don't construct our genome and environments before entering into the world. and even if it's externally designed, that's not an explanation, but merely kicking the can down the road.
if reality is somehow, in any way, in any degree (i am not at all convinced that we are not talking nonsense that only passes because syntactical correctness here) indeterministic, or probabilistic, how exactly would there be 'free-will'? literally unexplainable, non-relational, decoupled, merely occurring events render living organisms 'free-willed' how? i just don't see any argument here.
I'm not looking to argue; I simply wish to share my perspective and spark a meaningful conversation. To me, our lives and histories are more akin to trees than rivers. A tree's growth, while not entirely free, is an intricate dance with its environment. It's not just genetics that determine how it flourishes; its growth is influenced by its surroundings, its unique reactions to them, and internal decisions. Just like a tree, I believe we're not wholly predestined by our genes or early experiences.
I feel a strong sense of personal responsibility in shaping who I am. My choices, actions, and the transformative experiences I undergo play a pivotal role. It's like participating in a journey of self-evolution, where I have a significant say in my own metamorphosis.
I'm curious about your perspective on this. Do you feel as though your life's path is out of your control, or that you're not accountable for who you've become? From what I understand, you seem to lean more towards genetics and early experiences as primary shaping forces. However, I feel differently. My experiences, especially the current ones, continuously mold me, largely influenced by the choices I make. It's an ongoing, interactive dance of shaping and being shaped.
I'd love to hear your thoughts on this. Do you also see life as a constantly evolving journey influenced by your choices, or do you view it differently?
"To me, our lives and histories are more akin to trees than rivers. A tree's growth, while not entirely free, is an intricate dance with its environment. It's not just genetics that determine how it flourishes; its growth is influenced by its surroundings, its unique reactions to them, and internal decisions. Just like a tree, I believe we're not wholly predestined by our genes or early experiences."
look, the nature-nurture false dichotomy is kinda the OG zombie distinction.
we have the kind of nature that requires nurture, as lisa feldman-barrett puts it. what is natural is precisely that organisms develop differently due to their different histories, including the social and environmental aspects of that history.
Pretty much all biological theorists today are in agreement that the debate is solved because it is a case not of either/or but of both/and: nature and nurture always interact. Developmental systems theory takes this interactionist reasoning further. Developmental systems theory challenges the notion of two separable, interacting causes that could, in principle, be disentangled. It challenges the fundamental idea that nature and nurture can in fact be treated as separable sources of organismal form.
The key observation is that development is a process that unfolds over time. The organism’s genes are always present throughout that process, as is the organism’s environment. The two cannot be separated in principle because you can never observe how the organism would have developed under the influence of only the genes in isolation from the environment, or vice versa.
Crucially, development is not a battle between internal biological starting conditions and externally imposed cultural deviations that push the outcome away from what it would naturally have been. Although we may for analytic purposes wish to identify different aspects of the system with the labels “nature” and “culture,” ultimately these do not amount to ontologically separate forces that exert independent influences
robert sapolsky: "Instead of causes, biology is repeatedly about propensities, potentials, vulnerabilities, predispositions, proclivities, interactions, modulations, contingencies, if/then clauses, context dependencies, exacerbation or diminution of preexisting tendencies. Circles and loops and spirals and Möbius strips."
susan oyama: “The biological, the psychological, the social, and the cultural are related not as alternative causes but as levels of analysis.”
...
there is no 'me' over and above biology who is merely 'influenced' by biology and environment. that's again inviting dualism and essentialism and separation into a worldview, none of which i find convincing.
"Do you also see life as a constantly evolving journey influenced by your choices, or do you view it differently?"
i see it more like it's an unravelling. it might appear that it's being constructed from nothing, but it's just an unfolding with participants, witnesses. choices are choices are choices, but not magical choices that happen causa-sui, unmoored from developmental history.
"I feel a strong sense of personal responsibility in shaping who I am. My choices, actions, and the transformative experiences I undergo play a pivotal role. It's like participating in a journey of self-evolution, where I have a significant say in my own metamorphosis."
again, that's awesome, but why is that? of course your life's events play a pivotal role, but it cannot be otherwise! it is just a flux of happenings. there are explanations of why you feel how you feel, which is your developmental history. you don't just randomly feel whatever, just like AIs don't randomly use data they have not been fed.
I'm completely with you on this analysis. I just put more emphasis on _my_ role in my development. You can call my self an illusion, I wouldn't mind, but I would say it is a highly useful one,
My sense of transforming my self is very interesting to me. In other words, it seems to me that I am self-nurturing, an auto-poietic system that builds itself. Not without constraints, but with a strong role in its own development.
So, in my mind, your analysis is not wrong at all, it just has its limits in helping me how to live my life. While other analyses, eg that of Vervaeke, do include me in the picture, and give me a map in which I can navigate my own development.
it's not prophecy, but the precautionary principle. AGI is anyway unnecessary for invoking the precautionary principle, as advanced ANI can be utilized for causing massive damage.
"But I think the world doesn’t work like this. We are not in a river. We have free will, both individual and collective, and our decisions shape how the world unfolds."
well, that's... an assertion, but a woefully empirically unsupported one.
consider galen strawson's general argument against 'free-will'.
(1) You do what you do — in the circumstances in which you find yourself —because of the way you then are.
(2) So if you’re going to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you’re going to have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are — at least in certain mental respects.
(3) But you can’t be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
(4) So you can’t be ultimately responsible for what you do.
The key move is (3). Why can’t you be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all? In answer, consider an expanded version of the argument.
(a) It’s undeniable that the way you are initially is a result of your genetic inheritance and early experience.
(b) It’s undeniable that these are things for which you can’t be held to be in any way responsible (morally or otherwise).
(c) But you can’t at any later stage of life hope to acquire true or ultimate moral responsibility for the way you are by trying to change the way you already are as a result of genetic inheritance and previous experience.
(d) Why not? Because both the particular ways in which you try to change yourself, and the amount of success you have when trying to change yourself, will be determined by how you already are as a result of your genetic inheritance and previous experience.
(e) And any further changes that you may become able to bring about after you have brought about certain initial changes will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by your genetic inheritance and previous experience.
(i) Interested in free action, we’re particularly interested in actions performed for reasons (as opposed to reflex actions or mindlessly habitual actions).
(ii) When one acts for a reason, what one does is a function of how one is, mentally speaking. (It’s also a function of one’s height, one’s strength, one’s place and time, and so on, but it’s the mental factors that are crucial when moral responsibility is in question.)
(iii) So if one is going to be truly or ultimately responsible for how one acts, one must be ultimately responsible for how one is, mentally speaking — at least in certain respects.
(iv) But to be ultimately responsible for how one is, in any mental respect, one must have brought it about that one is the way one is, in that respect. And it’s not merely that one must have caused oneself to be the way one is, in that respect. One must also have consciously and explicitly chosen to be the way one is, in that respect, and one must also have succeeded in bringing it about that one is that way.
(v) But one can’t really be said to choose, in a conscious, reasoned, fashion, to be the way one is in any respect at all, unless one already exists, mentally speaking, already equipped with some principles of choice, “P1′′ — preferences, values, ideals — in the light of which one chooses how to be.
(vi) But then to be ultimately responsible, on account of having chosen to be the way one is, in certain mental respects, one must be ultimately responsible for one’s having the principles of choice P1 in the light of which one chose how to be.
(vii) But for this to be so one must have chosen P1, in a reasoned, conscious, intentional fashion.
(viii) But for this to be so one must already have had some principles of choice P2, in the light of which one chose P1.
(ix) And so on. Here we are setting out on a regress that we cannot stop. Ultimate responsibility for how one is is impossible, because it requires the actual completion of an infinite series of choices of principles of choice.
(x) So ultimate, buck-stopping moral responsibility is impossible, because it requires ultimate responsibility for how one is; as noted in (iii).
The metaphor quickly falls short for me: a waterfall at the end of a river is nothing extraordinary, it’s even a likely continuation. AGI would rather be akin to saying that the river ends with a dangerous Bifröst...
ajánlom az essentia foundation yt csatornájára feltöltött videót amelyben bernardo kastrup hans busstrával a 'szabad akarat' nemlétezéséről beszélget.
https://youtu.be/zoOi79nQywE?si=RGdKc07qfXTA9hFA
van egy érzésem, hogy figyelemre méltónak, érdekesnek találnád. bernardo a determinizmus--szabad akarat hamis dilemma nélkül is arra a következtetésre jut, hogy nincs semmi 'szabad akarat'. akarat esetleg lehet, sőt. de semmi rejtélyes 'szabad' szál nem alkotja.
Koszonom, nezem!
"We have free will, both individual and collective, and our decisions shape how the world unfolds."
i am not quite sure how you're using 'free-will' here, but decisions don't automatically imply any concept of 'free-will'. decisiding, deliberating, reflecting, choosing among options... don't require any conception of 'free-will'. we can do all these perfectly determined, and determinism doesn't entail predeterminism.
also, if there is determinism, or determinism+indeterminism (which is again an idea that the relevant experts don't at all agree on whether it's intelligible at all!), change and all our experiences are still perfectly real, just not necessarily have properties or 'natures' that we may pre-theoretically, maybe even implicitly, and rather tacitly assign to our experiences.
we choose, we reflect... just not magically, mysteriously, but deterministically, ie. explainably, intelligibly, in all-encompassing relational interdependence.
and again, it seems clear that reality is always exactly as it is, and it's not pre-designed by us; we don't construct our genome and environments before entering into the world. and even if it's externally designed, that's not an explanation, but merely kicking the can down the road.
if reality is somehow, in any way, in any degree (i am not at all convinced that we are not talking nonsense that only passes because syntactical correctness here) indeterministic, or probabilistic, how exactly would there be 'free-will'? literally unexplainable, non-relational, decoupled, merely occurring events render living organisms 'free-willed' how? i just don't see any argument here.
I'm not looking to argue; I simply wish to share my perspective and spark a meaningful conversation. To me, our lives and histories are more akin to trees than rivers. A tree's growth, while not entirely free, is an intricate dance with its environment. It's not just genetics that determine how it flourishes; its growth is influenced by its surroundings, its unique reactions to them, and internal decisions. Just like a tree, I believe we're not wholly predestined by our genes or early experiences.
I feel a strong sense of personal responsibility in shaping who I am. My choices, actions, and the transformative experiences I undergo play a pivotal role. It's like participating in a journey of self-evolution, where I have a significant say in my own metamorphosis.
I'm curious about your perspective on this. Do you feel as though your life's path is out of your control, or that you're not accountable for who you've become? From what I understand, you seem to lean more towards genetics and early experiences as primary shaping forces. However, I feel differently. My experiences, especially the current ones, continuously mold me, largely influenced by the choices I make. It's an ongoing, interactive dance of shaping and being shaped.
I'd love to hear your thoughts on this. Do you also see life as a constantly evolving journey influenced by your choices, or do you view it differently?
"To me, our lives and histories are more akin to trees than rivers. A tree's growth, while not entirely free, is an intricate dance with its environment. It's not just genetics that determine how it flourishes; its growth is influenced by its surroundings, its unique reactions to them, and internal decisions. Just like a tree, I believe we're not wholly predestined by our genes or early experiences."
look, the nature-nurture false dichotomy is kinda the OG zombie distinction.
we have the kind of nature that requires nurture, as lisa feldman-barrett puts it. what is natural is precisely that organisms develop differently due to their different histories, including the social and environmental aspects of that history.
Pretty much all biological theorists today are in agreement that the debate is solved because it is a case not of either/or but of both/and: nature and nurture always interact. Developmental systems theory takes this interactionist reasoning further. Developmental systems theory challenges the notion of two separable, interacting causes that could, in principle, be disentangled. It challenges the fundamental idea that nature and nurture can in fact be treated as separable sources of organismal form.
The key observation is that development is a process that unfolds over time. The organism’s genes are always present throughout that process, as is the organism’s environment. The two cannot be separated in principle because you can never observe how the organism would have developed under the influence of only the genes in isolation from the environment, or vice versa.
Crucially, development is not a battle between internal biological starting conditions and externally imposed cultural deviations that push the outcome away from what it would naturally have been. Although we may for analytic purposes wish to identify different aspects of the system with the labels “nature” and “culture,” ultimately these do not amount to ontologically separate forces that exert independent influences
robert sapolsky: "Instead of causes, biology is repeatedly about propensities, potentials, vulnerabilities, predispositions, proclivities, interactions, modulations, contingencies, if/then clauses, context dependencies, exacerbation or diminution of preexisting tendencies. Circles and loops and spirals and Möbius strips."
susan oyama: “The biological, the psychological, the social, and the cultural are related not as alternative causes but as levels of analysis.”
...
there is no 'me' over and above biology who is merely 'influenced' by biology and environment. that's again inviting dualism and essentialism and separation into a worldview, none of which i find convincing.
"Do you also see life as a constantly evolving journey influenced by your choices, or do you view it differently?"
i see it more like it's an unravelling. it might appear that it's being constructed from nothing, but it's just an unfolding with participants, witnesses. choices are choices are choices, but not magical choices that happen causa-sui, unmoored from developmental history.
"I feel a strong sense of personal responsibility in shaping who I am. My choices, actions, and the transformative experiences I undergo play a pivotal role. It's like participating in a journey of self-evolution, where I have a significant say in my own metamorphosis."
again, that's awesome, but why is that? of course your life's events play a pivotal role, but it cannot be otherwise! it is just a flux of happenings. there are explanations of why you feel how you feel, which is your developmental history. you don't just randomly feel whatever, just like AIs don't randomly use data they have not been fed.
I'm completely with you on this analysis. I just put more emphasis on _my_ role in my development. You can call my self an illusion, I wouldn't mind, but I would say it is a highly useful one,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJItB909Qms&t=3664s
My sense of transforming my self is very interesting to me. In other words, it seems to me that I am self-nurturing, an auto-poietic system that builds itself. Not without constraints, but with a strong role in its own development.
So, in my mind, your analysis is not wrong at all, it just has its limits in helping me how to live my life. While other analyses, eg that of Vervaeke, do include me in the picture, and give me a map in which I can navigate my own development.
it's not prophecy, but the precautionary principle. AGI is anyway unnecessary for invoking the precautionary principle, as advanced ANI can be utilized for causing massive damage.
"But I think the world doesn’t work like this. We are not in a river. We have free will, both individual and collective, and our decisions shape how the world unfolds."
well, that's... an assertion, but a woefully empirically unsupported one.
consider galen strawson's general argument against 'free-will'.
(1) You do what you do — in the circumstances in which you find yourself —because of the way you then are.
(2) So if you’re going to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you’re going to have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are — at least in certain mental respects.
(3) But you can’t be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
(4) So you can’t be ultimately responsible for what you do.
The key move is (3). Why can’t you be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all? In answer, consider an expanded version of the argument.
(a) It’s undeniable that the way you are initially is a result of your genetic inheritance and early experience.
(b) It’s undeniable that these are things for which you can’t be held to be in any way responsible (morally or otherwise).
(c) But you can’t at any later stage of life hope to acquire true or ultimate moral responsibility for the way you are by trying to change the way you already are as a result of genetic inheritance and previous experience.
(d) Why not? Because both the particular ways in which you try to change yourself, and the amount of success you have when trying to change yourself, will be determined by how you already are as a result of your genetic inheritance and previous experience.
(e) And any further changes that you may become able to bring about after you have brought about certain initial changes will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by your genetic inheritance and previous experience.
(i) Interested in free action, we’re particularly interested in actions performed for reasons (as opposed to reflex actions or mindlessly habitual actions).
(ii) When one acts for a reason, what one does is a function of how one is, mentally speaking. (It’s also a function of one’s height, one’s strength, one’s place and time, and so on, but it’s the mental factors that are crucial when moral responsibility is in question.)
(iii) So if one is going to be truly or ultimately responsible for how one acts, one must be ultimately responsible for how one is, mentally speaking — at least in certain respects.
(iv) But to be ultimately responsible for how one is, in any mental respect, one must have brought it about that one is the way one is, in that respect. And it’s not merely that one must have caused oneself to be the way one is, in that respect. One must also have consciously and explicitly chosen to be the way one is, in that respect, and one must also have succeeded in bringing it about that one is that way.
(v) But one can’t really be said to choose, in a conscious, reasoned, fashion, to be the way one is in any respect at all, unless one already exists, mentally speaking, already equipped with some principles of choice, “P1′′ — preferences, values, ideals — in the light of which one chooses how to be.
(vi) But then to be ultimately responsible, on account of having chosen to be the way one is, in certain mental respects, one must be ultimately responsible for one’s having the principles of choice P1 in the light of which one chose how to be.
(vii) But for this to be so one must have chosen P1, in a reasoned, conscious, intentional fashion.
(viii) But for this to be so one must already have had some principles of choice P2, in the light of which one chose P1.
(ix) And so on. Here we are setting out on a regress that we cannot stop. Ultimate responsibility for how one is is impossible, because it requires the actual completion of an infinite series of choices of principles of choice.
(x) So ultimate, buck-stopping moral responsibility is impossible, because it requires ultimate responsibility for how one is; as noted in (iii).
The metaphor quickly falls short for me: a waterfall at the end of a river is nothing extraordinary, it’s even a likely continuation. AGI would rather be akin to saying that the river ends with a dangerous Bifröst...